The rise of a technoscientific oligarchy in the United States and its impact on the reindustrialization dynamics

صعود الأوليغارشية التكنولوجية-العلمية في الولايات المتحدة وأثره على ديناميكية بعث التصنيع

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Abstract:

The U.S. executive branch reflects a tripartite power struggle among neoconservatives, technoscientific elites, and the MAGA movement which, despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, is consolidating central authority. Tensions flare over many issues, especially DOGE influence and urgent reshoring demands, particularly in high-tech sectors that once thrived on offshoring. While America's resilient economy holds potential for reindustrialization-driven revival, success hinges on risk-averse digital oligarchs adopting techno-nationalist strategies. Ultimatly, the administration's legacy will be judged by tangible industrial outcomes (trade, patents, productivity) and not on ideological promises. A successful pivot could birth a transformative techno-nationalist movement; failure risks deindustrialization and discord.

Keywords: United States; China; Trump; Post-Industrial Society; digital oligarchy.

ملخص:

تُجسِّد السلطة التنفيذية الأمريكية صراعًا ثلاثيًا بين المحافظين الجدد والنخبة التقنو-علمية وحركة "ماغا" التي تعزز سلطتها رغم خطابها المعادي للمؤسسات الرسمية، حيث تتصاعد التوترات حول قضايا مثل تأثير وكالة الكفاءة الحكومية والمطالبات العاجلة بإعادة التصنيع، خاصة في القطاعات التكنولوجية التي اعتمدت سابقًا على العولمة. ورغم مرونة الاقتصاد الأمريكي وقابليته للانتعاش عبر إعادة التصنيع، فإن النجاح مرهون بقبول الأوليغارشية الرقمية المتحفظة للاستراتيجيات القومية التكنولوجية. في النهاية، سيقاس إرث هذه الإدارة بالنتائج الصناعية الملموسة (ميزان تجاري، براءات الاختراع والإنتاجية) وليس بالوعود الأيديولوجية، حيث قد يؤدي النجاح إلى ولادة حركة قومية تكنولوجية فاعلة، بينما يعرّض الفشل البلاد لعدة مخاطر.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الولايات المتحدة؛ الصين؛ ترامب؛ المجتمع ما بعد الصناعي؛ الأوليغارشية الرقمية.

Introduction

With the advent of the post-Cold War era, marked by the triumph of the West over communism as both an idea and a socio-political system, the academic world witnessed the spectacular rise of the “end of History” thesis[1], accompanied by an unstoppable worldwide acculturation wave, affecting all spheres of life. Nothing was spared, from consumption patterns, which became Westernized, to governance standards whose implementation (sometimes under pressure) was actively supported by Bretton Woods institutions. That said, in parallel, the United States itself would undergo profound changes, first societal, then extending to all sectors, beginning with the national economy, whose structure was visibly reshaped by a significant and deliberate wave of deindustrialization.

The powerful undercurrent driving this major wave of change was a technoscientific ideology rooted in the very history of the United States, particularly the liberal tendencies that shaped the nation’s founding, as well as the neoliberal shift of the 1980s under the Reagan administration. This transformation, characterized by deregulation, a shift toward service-sector

specialization, entrepreneurial freedom, and a minimalist state model[2], unfolded in an ideologically and strategically favorable context.

The result was the emergence of a "postindustrial society", much like the one foreshadowed by several thinkers, including Daniel Bell, who argued that the future would be defined by knowledge and innovation[3]. For Bell, this was a natural evolution, even an inevitable transition for American society.

History, however, would reveal that this evolution would bring recurring economic crises as well as societal dysfunctions, as the new growth model demonstrated its limits, particularly in terms of social justice. Today, with the inclusion of various figures in the new U.S. administration whose backgrounds are closely tied to the Silicon Valley elite, reflecting, in a way, the aforementioned technoscientific ideology, the debate has reignited over the role (or influence) of high-tech leaders in American governance, especially under the scenario of power being concentrated in their hands.

This situation would become even more intriguing if we witness a tactical alliance between messianic/neoconservative-leaning politicians, and Silicon Valley figures & oligarchs, a hypothesis supported by a growing body of analysis pointing to the emergence and growing influence of ideologies aligned with this trend. Terms like *technologism*, *techno-nationalism*, *techno-caesarism*, *eugenics*, and *transhumanism* are increasingly invoked[4], labels and concepts that highlight the ferment of the U.S. sociopolitical landscape, as well as the underlying power struggles surrounding this issue.

This paper aims to analyze the drivers and implications of the rise of the technological elite in the United States, particularly its foray into the political sphere following Donald Trump's victory in the recent presidential election. This development presents a paradox: this elite embodies the very idea of "post-industrial transcendence" and, in the same time, aligns itself with a president whose rhetoric is squarely focused on reindustrializing the nation.

Another layer of this paradox lies in the scope -or horizon- of this globalized elite, whose interests appear inherently at odds with those of an America temporarily turning inward. Thus, what would be the impact of fully integrating the tech elite into the U.S. administration? And what repercussions

might such a shift have on societal choices already made, particularly the post-industrial turn taken at the end of the last century?

This article will examine the origins of the technoscientific ideology championed by this elite, while also exploring the implications of integrating certain oligarchs and representatives of Big Tech companies into the government, even at the heart of power. To what extent will this choice prove fruitful? Could it trigger social regression? Will it fulfill the current president's coveted pursuit of power, particularly regarding reindustrialization policies? These questions encapsulate the core issues framing this study.

Accordingly, we must investigate the ideological background of the Silicon Valley elite now occupying key positions in the Trump administration, including their stances on industrialization and the social preferences articulated by this microcosm's leaders. Adopting a systemic vision, our approach integrates multiple perspectives and is inherently multidimensional. Particular emphasis, however, will be placed on the geopolitical lens, given the United States' enduring role as a primary actor in the globalized economy. To address the above issue, this study is structured around the following axes:

Section one: Implementing the post-industrial model
Sub-section 1: The post-industrial model as a socio-economic necessity
Sub-section 2: The post-industrial model as a political choice
Sub-section 3: The rise of technoscientific ideology in the United States
Section two: Challenges posed by the transition to a post-industrial society
Sub-section 1: Post-industrial choice in the United States: implementation under strain
Sub-section 2: Faced with the rise of China: what does the future hold for the digital giants?
Section three: Techno-oligarchs and neoconservatives: how do they interact at the heart of power?
Sub-section 1: Legacy of the post-industrial era
Sub-section 2: Relevance of the technoscientific choice in the United States

Section one: Implementing the post-industrial model

In the United States, the transition to a post-industrial society was gradually imposed by a succession of measures, but it was also the result of a context, a combination of economic, social, technological and political factors that made this evolution possible.

Sub-section 1: The post-industrial model as a socio-economic necessity

Beyond ideological considerations, America's postindustrial transition was also driven by structural economic shifts in the 1970s, as the nation confronted new Asian competitors wielding significant advantages, particularly lower labor costs. This precipitated both a relative decline in U.S. economic dominance and the consolidation of a postindustrial model, manifested through the rise of tertiary sectors like finance, technology, and education. These fields generated substantially higher value-added compared to traditional manufacturing, which had previously served as the primary engine of economic growth.

The global expansion ambitions of American corporations further accelerated production offshoring to low-cost countries (following comparative advantage principles)[5], cementing U.S. specialization in service-based economies while relegating manufacturing abroad, all unfolding against a geopolitical backdrop already strained by energy resource tensions[6].

This economic trajectory adhered to liberal (even neoliberal) logic, which gained decisive traction during Reagan's administration. Reaganism entrenched the doctrine of minimal state intervention in economic affairs and promoted globalized specialization[7]. The ideological climate proved highly receptive, aligned with the gradual emergence of postindustrial society, a transition foreshadowed by thinkers like Daniel Bell. His model demoted industrial production to secondary status, prioritizing knowledge-based services and innovation as the natural evolution of American society. Beyond purely economic factors, the postindustrial shift was equally driven by profound societal changes, including the rise of consumer culture, growing

individualism, digital expansion, and the cultural effects of education and globalization[8].

This transformation was actively promoted by mass media, which reshaped social practices, societal structures, and cultural norms, ultimately reducing individuals to mere consumers[9]. This environment also fostered the emergence of various activist movements promoting ideologies that challenged traditional norms[10], paving the way for wokeism, as an umbrella ideology unifying diverse schools of thought (left-wing attitudes and practices).

Collectively, these sociocultural shifts accelerated the transition toward a postindustrial society centered on the knowledge economy, prioritizing creative and intellectual jobs, particularly in tech. This led to declining unionization and heightened individualism in American society, redefining labor dynamics, consumption patterns, and cultural values[11]. It also precipitated the relative decline of industrialized regions in America's heartland, notably the "Rust Belt"[12], while wealth and economic activity became concentrated in the hands of a "super-creative core"[13], a new dominant class that obviously embodies technoscientific ideology.

The technological advances stemming from these changes (especially automation and algorithmic systems) further reduced labor demand in manufacturing, hastening the knowledge economy's dominance over material production. Yet this progress also created new socioeconomic challenges, particularly concerning employment stability.

Thus, the societal factors enabling the transition to a postindustrial society were undeniably present, beginning with the entrenched "scientific bureaucracy"[14] that accelerated the push toward hyper-specialization, a prerequisite for implementing this new development model. This model inherently demanded a reconfiguration of societal roles. The shift moved America from the industrial prowess of the 1960s, to a focus on intellectual and technological professions, a transition fueled by the democratization of education[15] and the "invisible hand" of an establishment that deliberately overlooked the gradual erosion of the nation's industrial base. Instead, they

embraced the service economy as a seemingly natural alternative, despite the labor market disruptions and inequalities it generated.

Sub-section 2: The post-industrial model as a political choice

Far from any determinism and beyond socioeconomic considerations, the transition to a post-industrial society was also a political choice that was decisively made during the Ronald Reagan administration, as evidenced by the various neoliberal measures implemented, which particularly benefited companies embodying the globalized momentum. The priorities of this administration were, first, tax reduction via the *Economic Recovery Tax Act*[16], aimed at encouraging investment and consumption. Next, the shift toward a less regulated economy, especially in finance, to stimulate innovation[17]. And finally, the pursuit of budgetary balance, which translated into cuts in public spending, particularly social programs[18].

What would later be dubbed "Reaganomics" did indeed lead to a period of growth and falling unemployment (from 10.8% in 1982 to 5.3% in 1989), accompanied by controlled inflation (from 13.5% in 1980 to 4.1% in 1988). However, it was the oligarchs of the new economy who reaped the benefits of these gains, while poverty increased across American society, exacerbated by shrinking tax revenues for the state[19]. Moreover, by the end of Reagan's term, there was a sharp rise in national debt (from 997 billion in 1981 to 2.8 trillion in 1989). This ultimately points to the rise of an oligarchic elite firmly convinced of the virtues of financialization, while the state suffered declining revenues[20].

Under George H. W. Bush, the financial and technology sectors continued to be prioritized[21], while manufacturing further declined, losing ground to emerging economies, particularly China. For Bush, supporting the ICT sector[22] had the stated goal of strengthening U.S. technological competitiveness[23] in an increasingly connected and digital world. Bill Clinton likewise maintained the post-industrial course, furthering economic liberalization and paving the way for more offshoring, most notably through the North American Free Trade Agreement (1992)[24]. The Information and

Communication Technologies (ICT) sector also remained a priority with the passage of the Telecommunications Act in 1996.

Still following the same neoliberal approach, George W. Bush implemented aggressive measures to promote the tech sector, enabling ICT to experience unprecedented expansion[25]. This growth was driven by the widespread adoption of the Internet and the development of technological infrastructure. Thus, under Bush, the post-industrial society became a tangible reality, an ecosystem dominated by services and finance. Barack Obama further accelerated the digital shift, sidelining any prospects of reindustrialization. During his administration, support for tech innovation came through initiatives like Startup America[26] and the Open Government Initiative[27].

In short, the shift toward a post-industrial society was not solely the result of socioeconomic factors, nor was it the outcome of a single decision. Instead, it unfolded gradually through deliberate strategic choices. Moreover, this transition was not centrally planned; rather, it emerged from a new balance of power among key players, an internal realignment that allowed tech giants to penetrate the heart of political influence. Ultimately, it was a compromise, a collective response to a unique socioeconomic & technological context, a choice that would profoundly shape the future of the United States.

Sub-section 3: The rise of technoscientific ideology in the United States

"Technology is far from neutral or universal", as David Weinberger reminds us in an article titled *"A Value-free Internet"*, published on May 14, 2001, in *The Journal of the Hyperlinked Organization*[28]. Indeed, it necessarily reflects a set of specific social values, inherent particularly to the cultural context of 1960s America, where progress, freedom, and elitism were emphasized. In the United States, the technoscientific ideology, inherited from the Enlightenment and championed by figures like Jefferson and Franklin, promised a better future through innovation. Though non-dogmatic, it shaped American society by encouraging patents and research within a favorable legal framework, partly explaining the country's industrial and military dominance.

This ideology took root thanks to a fertile cultural, political, and legal environment, nurturing a utopian and almost messianic vision of the future, a perspective aligned with the concept of *"Manifest Destiny"*, centered on the idea of America's divine mission to export its civilizational model. Historically, this paradigm drove the conquest of the West, supported by technological advances (especially in transportation), and forged the American entrepreneurial spirit, still driven by a desire to push boundaries that propelled the U.S. to global industrial and technological leadership[29].

The technoscientific ideology elevated science to the status of a new religion, promising answers to existential questions. Though criticized for its *"techno-solutionism"* and mercantile excesses, it profoundly transformed Americans' relationship with science. Its defenders justify its excesses by its role in U.S. global hegemony, symbolized by the image of the *"City upon a Hill"* [30].

Despite criticism, this ideology was embraced by part of the establishment, particularly neoconservatives, who saw -and still see- it as a tool of power. In the past, it accelerated the transition to a postindustrial society, where information technologies were perceived as solutions to social problems, and today, it promises to restore the instruments of American dominance.

The rise of the technoscientific movement complicates domestic politics, creating a triangular power dynamic among neoconservatives, the MAGA movement, and the digital oligarchy. Points of convergence are numerous: neoconservatives aim to reinforce America's declining global power, while MAGA is deeply invested in technological and industrial sovereignty (with many examples to cite), suggesting broad potential for cooperation. However, technoscientists often criticize the State's use of technology for surveillance, even as the government justifies it in the name of national security. A pragmatic collaboration could still emerge around strategic projects like semiconductors, AI, or supply chain security.

Yet this alliance remains fragile, as these actors -though united by a quasi-messianic technological optimism- clash over the issue of globalism.

Tech giants, rooted in an interconnected and anti-isolationist vision, contrast with the nationalist tendencies of part of the establishment. Even so, figures like Peter Thiel demonstrate how lines can blur, merging cultural conservatism with the promotion of innovation. The future will thus depend on unpredictable configurations, balancing ideological rivalries and ad-hoc cooperation.

Section two: Challenges posed by the transition to a post-industrial society

Between 1990 and 2010, the United States will face major geopolitical challenges that will challenge its hyperpower, but it will also be a period of substantial economic growth, punctuated by crises[31]. The challenge was thus twofold: to respond to a changing external context, while at the same time meeting the challenge of an America in the throes of transformation, due to the advent of the digital economy and the rise of global players, elements whose analysis requires a resolutely geo-economic outlook.

Sub-section 1: Post-industrial choice in the United States: an implementation under strain

A brief overview of the evolution of the U.S. economy reveals that the United States went all-in on ICT, achieving significant gains but also enduring notable setbacks. That said, overall, the post-industrial model led to the creation of 17 million jobs between March 1991 and January 1999, accompanied by a spectacular stock market surge and clear fiscal discipline (the deficit shrank from 290 billion in1992, to 22 billion in 1997)[32].

While in 1990 the U.S. GDP stood at 5.9 trillion, by 2000 it reached 10.2 trillion, before stabilizing at $15 trillion in 2010[33]. These achievements can be explained by sustained investments in new technologies[34], whose rise propelled digital giants like Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and Google onto the international stage. These companies experienced spectacular growth, contributing not only to the increase in American wealth, but also to bolstering its soft power through favorable content. The U.S. economy thus saw strong GDP growth, with a market capitalization of nearly $2 trillion in

2010 for the tech sector alone[35]. Since then, the leaders of the "GAFAM" (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) have established themselves as privileged partners of the U.S. administration, wielding increasingly significant political influence. Moreover, even the destabilizing effects of the Dot-Com Bubble did not diminish their power[36], nor did the recession that severely impacted the entire U.S. economy[37].

Beyond the Dot-Com Bubble crisis, the U.S. also grappled with the repercussions of deindustrialization, a process that steadily eroded its manufacturing capabilities as the tertiary sector expanded. While betting on the inexorable rise of services did generate jobs, it came at a cost: America endured a devastating deindustrialization that unfolded over decades, wiping out highly skilled manufacturing jobs (*Good Jobs*)[38]. This shift also eroded social protections and exacerbated inequality. Between 2007 and 2010, 8.7 million jobs were lost, particularly in the automotive and textile sectors[39].

Factory closures triggered chain reactions, ranging from economic losses for entire regions to social crises and demographic upheavals. In this context, over 45,000 factories shut down between 2002 and 2022[40], affecting millions of households (through direct or indirect job losses)[41]. Detroit, once the heart of North America's automotive industry, became a stark symbol of deindustrialization, its population shrinking dramatically, losing 44,000 residents (6% of its total)[42] from 2010 to 2020. Similarly, Chicago saw a 25% decline in manufacturing jobs between 2006 and 2017, linked to the Great Recession[43]. This reflects a national trend[44]: according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, manufacturing jobs now account for just 8% of U.S. employment, down from a peak of 30%[45].

In the United States, deindustrialization unfolded as a slow, complex process with far-reaching societal consequences. Simultaneously, it fueled the rise of Big Tech (exemplified by the GAFAM+ giants), whose growing power often diverges from state priorities, a paradox and a challenge for a superpower increasingly exposed to the strategies of digital multinationals. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and social media platforms (META and

X) now wield outsized influence, shaping global public opinion while operating with relative autonomy.

Today, what's become undeniable is the ability of U.S. tech giants to transcend their corporate roles and enter the political arena, even positioning themselves as leading sociopolitical actors. Their influence now extends far beyond economics and technology, visibly permeating politics, culture, and social life (in particular through the exploitation of users metadata)[46].

Indeed, having thrived in an economic climate tailored to their advantage, these actors emerged as oligarchs, even developing proactive strategies to shape their environment, particularly the political sphere, ensuring regulations favored their interests. Far from operating transparently, they often employ "aggressive" or even opaque fiscal strategies to "optimize" profits[47]. To this is added the systematic use of precarious contracts, particularly for permanent workers misclassified as independent (coerced Uberization)[48]. For these workers, job instability is often an inevitable reality, with severely limited social protections.

Equally troubling are the monopolistic practices these "giants" employ over user data, granting them disproportionate influence and unique opportunities to commodify personal information. Unsurprisingly, this dynamic should concern -or even alarm- political authorities, especially those attuned to the manipulation of social movements.

These actors now represent a highly strategic asset, given the vast troves of data they control. With their immense capabilities, they have become privileged tools of social engineering, capable of manipulating populations, particularly during electoral cycles subtly[49], or even reshaping societies. This is especially true for Big Tech (GAFAM+), which accounts for a dominant share of U.S. stock market capitalization in the digital economy. They embody what Shoshana Zuboff terms "surveillance capitalism", a system pioneered and perfected by Google but now ubiquitous[50].

Fully aware of this power, they extend their influence through aggressive lobbying, often regulatory and superficially transparent, enabling them to sway key policymakers with massive financial investments[51]. The U.S.

government now faces entities it struggles to control, yet whose cultural and media influence grows unchecked. These giants dominate information flows to the American public, displacing traditional media and actively molding public opinion.

The debate is thus open to the question of political manipulation, but also the cultural domination exercised by digital platforms that are apparently de-ideologized and whose slogans are, moreover, libertarian. In fact, these platforms turn out to be culturally and politically oriented, hence the relevance of questioning the state of diversity of opinion on these platforms, as well as their ideological orientations, at a time when the United States seems more divided than ever, against a backdrop of accusations of censorship and disinformation.

Sub-section 2: Faced with the rise of China: what does the future hold for the digital giants?

The issue of declining U.S. technological dominance has become increasingly urgent in recent years, particularly when examining the fierce patent competition with China, a key metric for assessing America's strategic strength. The U.S. now confronts China's ambitious "Made in China 2025" industrial and technological development program, which has created ideal conditions for Chinese players to secure dominant positions in critical tech sectors[52].

Recent studies confirm that the U.S. has lost its global lead in patent filings to China, a claim supported by data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). In 2021, American entities filed 591,473 patents (17.5% of the global total), far behind China's 1.59 million. While the U.S. retains a significant lead over other competitors like Japan (289,200) and South Korea (237,998)[53]. China also surpasses it in active patents, 3.6 million versus 3.3 million in 2021[54]. More recently, the World Intellectual Property Indicators 2024 report highlights China's accelerating momentum: 1,677,701 patent applications in 2023, up from 1,619,268 in 2022. Meanwhile, the U.S. stagnated (594,340 in 2022 vs. 598,085 in 2023)[55].

Beyond quantity, the global digital landscape is steadily and unmistakably tilting toward Chinese dominance, where massive manufacturing capabilities now converge with technological prowess, fueled by decades of techno-nationalist policies nurturing national champions. While U.S. Big Tech (GAFAM+) once underpinned American power, it now faces formidable Chinese rivals (Alibaba Group, Baidu, ByteDance, and Tencent)[56] firms resistant to Western influence and increasingly outcompeting American counterparts in key markets[57].

Today, the rise of DeepSeek (by High-Flyer) in the global AI landscape underscores China's dynamism, and the fierce competition now facing U.S. firms. From a geo-economic perspective, this represents a strategic gain for China, especially within the context of the ongoing techno-commercial war between Beijing and Washington. DeepSeek stands out for its innovative approach, a critical asset against still-dominant American giants like Google, OpenAI, Microsoft, Meta, and Amazon, which continue to command the AI arena.

Yet this Chinese firm is merely the tip of the iceberg. Behind it lies a dense ecosystem of promising players, including Baidu, Alibaba Cloud, Tencent, Huawei, SenseTime, Megvii (Face++), and iFlytek, some of which belong to the so-called *"Seven New AI Giants"* (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent)[58].

These Chinese competitors are well positioned to expand internationally, especially as their American rivals face the risks of stock market overvaluation. For American AI players, exposure to such financial volatility remains a credible threat, comparable to a potential "AI bubble", similar to the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s.

Aside from the possibility of a technological downgrading of the United States in the face of China, America is also confronted with the limits of its digital giants in terms of penetrating emerging markets, with access to hundreds of millions of users at stake. This was notably the case for Apple, whose access to the Chinese market was sometimes compromised by the trade war between the two global digital powers. In fact, tensions between China

and the United States periodically escalate around Apple's activities in China, concerning commercial practices deemed unfair by the Chinese regulatory authorities (restrictions on payment methods in the App Store, reassessment of fees to the detriment of local developers, etc.)[59]. For the Chinese authorities, these practices could penalize competition and harm local consumers, and for Apple, losing the Chinese market -its second largest after the United States- is not a desirable scenario, all the more so as in China the trend is towards "patriotically responsible" consumption (i.e. consumption in favor of giants such as Huawei)[60]. Such a development could lead to a significant drop in Apple's revenues in China, a strategic market for its growth[61].

In light of recent geopolitical and economic tensions with China, whose market is becoming more demanding for American digital giants, the worst-case scenario is that of a technological, and then gradually, economic decoupling between the two ecosystems. Even if this remains unlikely in the short term, certain signs point to such a development, starting with the gradual diversification of supply chains on both sides.

However, there are indications that the chances of a decoupling scenario should be minimized, which, for American players, could mean the loss of the Chinese market (1.4 billion consumers), particularly if relocations outside China continue. Indeed, a presence in this market is essential for the growth of all players with global ambitions, even those from the United States.

In this scenario, the American digital oligarchs would be forced to temper their techno-nationalism, particularly if we accept the level of technological innovation achieved in China, which makes it one of the best ecosystems for technologically developed production. Even on the Chinese side, there is little appetite for decoupling, or for an economic war with the United States. In fact, Chinese leaders remain concerned about a possible war with the United States, a dynamic that brings with it economic sanctions that drastically limit technology transfers (legislation concerning several critical goods)[62]. The thesis of pacification through trade is thus compromised.

Ultimately, it would seem that those who will be most penalized by a possible decoupling from China are the digital oligarchs, those who have benefited from the "digital shift" in the United States, and who have relocated their activities (or certain segments) to China, following a purely economic rationale, divorced from any techno-nationalist considerations. The latter, who represent the globalized elite in the USA, maintain close and complex economic relations with China, far removed from any geo-economic or ethical considerations. Economic logic alone prevails in this relationship.

Thus, the implementation of a reindustrialization strategy in the United States may face a major stumbling block, as the digital oligarchs have to re-evaluate their international positioning if they are to comply with the "patriotic" demands of the new administration, and this choice will be all the more difficult for those of them who take an active part in power.

Section three: Techno-oligarchs and neoconservatives: how do they interact at the heart of power?

From the moment it took office, the current administration has consistently stated that its priority is to restore America's brilliance in a number of areas, starting with industry. At this level, the country faces major challenges, from its aging and uncompetitive industrial base to its need for sustainable domestic investment, not to mention the need for a clear and coherent economic vision at the top of the government, meeting the expectations of the different currents represented in power.

Sub-section 1: Legacy of the post-industrial era

In the recent history of the American economy, the brief post-industrial interlude will ultimately weaken the United States in the face of emerging competition, primarily from Asia. This weakening was primarily manifested through the 2008 financial crisis (the Subprime Mortgage Crisis), a downturn with global repercussions that exposed the vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system, particularly speculative practices across various sectors. This crisis, linked to the country's post-industrial shift, triggered a severe recession,

accompanied by an 8.5% contraction in GDP[63], unemployment nearing 10% in 2010, and a surge in public debt[64].

The result was a significantly weakened America, with an increasingly impoverished society where wealth gradually concentrated in the hands of a minority. Even in terms of regional balance, the country witnessed a reshaping of its economic geography due to deindustrialization. This created innovation hubs, where wealth accumulated, while leaving many declining regions, particularly those once thriving in manufacturing, struggling with instability[65].

At the same time, we will witness rising inequality and a concentration of economic power, leading to a weakening of democracy[66]. This regression can be explained by the control of media by a handful of oligarchs and the use of new technologies to manipulate the masses. Thus, we will see a post-industrial society with significantly weakened social and political structures, one where risks are global and unpredictable[67], and where there is a slow but steady erosion of democratic practices through subtle yet undeniable restrictions.

The global expansion and successes of American economic players stand in stark contrast to the instability the United States will experience. The systemic crises it will face, stemming from its post-industrial transition, will become its primary source of vulnerability. This partly explains the U.S.'s relative decline compared to China, a rising giant seeking to surpass its outsider status and dominate the full spectrum of power.

The end of the 2010s marked the beginning of the shift toward a post-unipolar era (a Gramscian *chiaroscuro*), transitory phase in which American power showed multiple signs of weakness, starting with the limits of financialization, widening inequality, and the challenges posed by uncontrolled public debt. However, it is worth noting that America has maintained a strong capacity for resilience in the face of shocks, as well as the economic shift toward the East, while still retaining significant influence in key centers of global economic power. The same applies to its enduring appeal to skilled professionals (selective migration). The coming challenge,

therefore, is to move beyond the Bretton Woods legacy and reinvent itself in order to contain the rise of emerging powers, determined players seeking to assert themselves in an ever-changing economic landscape.

For the United States, China remains the primary economic rival, a competitor formidable enough to challenge American dominance across multiple domains. Yet, the interdependence between these two powers remains a reality that is difficult to overcome, particularly for American firms that benefited from the post-industrial shift of the past century and capitalized on globalization by outsourcing their operations, either partially or entirely, to other regions, including China.

From its initial market liberalization in 1978[68] to its accession to the WTO in 2001, China successfully transformed itself into the "world's factory", securing steady inflows of capital and expertise -particularly in new technologies- enabling it to achieve growth rates rarely matched elsewhere. Between 1990 and 2010, its average annual growth reached 9.5%[69], earning the confidence of investors and rapidly increasing its share in the global value chain. Meanwhile, during this same period, American industry entered a phase of decline. For China, securing a dominant position in global governance is an objective now within reach, further bolstered by megaprojects like the Belt and Road Initiative, an assertive move among many others, reflecting ambitions that extend beyond mere economic influence. This signals an era of open economic warfare, far removed from the optimism that surrounded China's WTO accession in 2001.

Like China, India also competes with the United States by participating in the outsourcing of services, a phenomenon that has become widespread and detrimental to the American economy. Other challenges arise from Brazil regarding agricultural subsidies and intellectual property disputes, from Russia concerning economic sanctions, and from EU countries over tariffs, irregular subsidies, and conflicts surrounding the activities of Big Tech (GAFAM+).

Admittedly, deglobalization is not yet on the agenda, nor is a reduction in international trade, despite the occasional emergence of protectionist

policies. However, deglobalization is not merely about measurable economic flows, it is also a normative discourse[70], particularly for those denouncing neoliberal excesses, such as abusive offshoring and the increasing financialization of the economy. These factors have contributed to the deindustrialization of the United States and have given the MAGA movement significant visibility, built more on job-related concerns than any other electoral issues (migration, gender & patriotism). In fact, since 2008, the U.S. economic model has revealed its limits, despite its various strengths: energy, technology, and human capital.

Sub-section 2: Relevance of the technoscientific choice in the United States

To meet the challenge of reindustrialization in the United States, the Trump II administration does have leverage that could put the American economy back on the path to sustainable growth. However, its major domestic challenge lies in reconciling two competing priorities: the push for reindustrialization demanded by economically distressed regions (the MAGA vision), and the interests of a globalized elite from the high-tech sector, a key component that helped propel the current president to power. To what extent will the technoscientific elite adhere to this objective? Will this elite be able to transcend its globalized outlook and interests to embrace a firmly nationalist agenda?

Within the current administration, the leading figure of the technoscientific faction was Elon Musk, head of DOGE, whose social and political stances are as unconventional as they are unpredictable. He champions an assertive form of economic and social liberalism, even bordering on libertarianism. Politically, he is a staunch advocate for a minimalist state, a vision he vigorously promotes within DOGE, where he implemented his highly demanding managerial style.

In essence, beyond his well-defined liberal convictions, Musk lacks a clearly articulated ideology. He simultaneously embodies technological optimism, entrepreneurial capitalism, and the pursuit of progress, allowing him to integrate seamlessly into the current administration. His pragmatism

and adaptability may eventually enable him to reconcile his personal objectives with reindustrialization goals, even when they appear contradictory at times. For Musk, the current administration's priorities will likely focus on accelerating technological innovation and further deregulation, intermediate objectives achievable through two main avenues: encouraging investments in key sectors (AI, 5G, biotechnology & renewable energy) crucial for maintaining U.S. strategic dominance, and reducing regulations to foster corporate innovation and growth. In this framework, the administration could create an optimal environment to support digital giants, those major tech firms seeking favorable tax conditions and market opportunities.

There is no doubt that high-tech leaders who adhere to this ideology or vision (figures like Musk, Bezos or Zuckerberg), often referred to as techno-oligarchs, have amassed considerable fortunes that was translated into power and influence. Their classification as such stems precisely from their ability to steer public debates and shape federal policies, not to mention their sway over markets and social behaviors. That said, the people belonging to this ideology and who can contribute to decision-making processes and to the work of social engineering more generally, are not necessarily all oligarchs, as the installation of DOGE (a radical structure through which a disruptive approach is proposed in terms of public policies) teaches us.

This entity brought to power a "competence-based" technoscientific elite now occupying significant economic and political positions. It includes managers, researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs united by their proximity to Musk (The DOGE Kids)[71], who could potentially form -should the alliance with the MAGA movement endure- a new nomenklatura[72]: a power network resembling the scientific bureaucracy characteristic of postindustrial society models. These individuals might serve as tools for the DOGE leader in his quest to streamline administration and control government agency spending, or even as instruments to combat what MAGA supporters call the "Deep State" in America.

If he does not come into direct conflict with the neoconservative component, as a influential advisor to Trump, Musk could push for

accelerating the energy transition by promoting renewable and clean energy technologies, particularly electric vehicles, potentially leading to a rapid shift toward a decarbonized economy. However, this momentum may face resistance, as several regions of the country remain economically dependent on fossil fuel industries. Moreover, Musk -himself an electric vehicle manufacturer- could face potential conflict of interest allegations, a criticism that might also extend to his cryptocurrency ventures, SpaceX, and Starlink operations.

The new administration's proposed approach to government reform and economic stimulus offers certain inherent advantages through technological innovation, energy transition, and infrastructure modernization. Yet if the current team persists with past post-industrial choices, negative consequences could emerge: widening social and regional inequalities, increased job insecurity due to automation and AI adoption, and even the risk of an Orwellian society emerging from excessive power concentration among a handful of tech corporations. These factors may provoke resistance within the administration itself, not to mention scrutiny from lobby groups and civil society organizations monitoring developments related to industrial sovereignty and, by extension, technological sovereignty.

For the Trump II administration, reshoring sensitive industries represents a current priority. This initiative aims to bring production chains -particularly semiconductors- back to U.S. soil, receiving special attention amid ongoing geopolitical and technological rivalry. It's worth noting that even before this administration took office, the United States had already initiated large-scale industrial reshoring of strategic supply chains, focusing particularly on critical sectors like semiconductors and batteries. To facilitate this transition, financial incentives (including tax credits and subsidies) were established through favorable legislation, notably the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit (2022), the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), and the Inflation Reduction Act (2022)[73].

These measures have encouraged some national giants to reinvest in the United States, such as Intel, which announced in 2022 an investment of nearly

$20 billion, dedicated to the construction of two semiconductor factories in Ohio, with the potential to generate 3,000 skilled jobs and 7,000 indirect jobs[74]. However, far from having a strictly national vocation, this policy of tax incentives and subsidies also targets foreign firms, such as TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), a global semiconductor giant which, in May 2020, announced its intention to install a semiconductor factory in Phoenix, Arizona, with an initial fund of $12 billion (production of 5 nanometer chips). In December 2022, the same firm also announced its intention to build a second site in Phoenix, with an initial fund of $40 billion (production of 3 nanometer chips). Today, this dynamic has materialized with investments of $65 billion, but the Taiwanese giant has announced an additional investment ($100 billion), for the construction of two new sites specialized in the packaging of semiconductors and a center for R&D[75].

The current administration aims to capitalize on this reshoring trend to launch more projects, employing the spectacular announcement style characteristic of President Trump. In a March 7, 2025 progress report speech[76], Trump claimed that during the final year of the Biden administration, 110,000 well-paid industrial jobs ("*good jobs*") were lost, averaging nearly 9,000 monthly losses. He contrasted this with what he described as the previous administration's focus on government and non-productive jobs. The new objective, Trump asserted, is reducing government's footprint while expanding the private sector, a goal already seemingly achieved, with 93% of jobs created in Trump's first month reportedly coming from private industry.

This reveals the influence of DOGE through the President's actions and rhetoric, combining aggressive political marketing with clearly defined, time-bound objectives. Linking employment and immigration in his speech, Trump noted that for the first time in 15 months, native-born Americans had outpaced immigrants or foreign-born workers in job gains, a clear nod to his campaign themes. Naturally, this stance risks alienating Silicon Valley elites, who may view it as stigmatizing immigrant Americans. Yet for now, pragmatism appears to be prevailing.

A brief analysis of the American president's statements and media interactions reveals his self-portrayal as a reformer addressing injustices affecting native-born Americans (whom he seeks to reassure), trade partners (whom he attempts to intimidate), and industrialists, both domestic and foreign (whom he tries to recruit for his strategy, now rebranded as a "national cause"). He skillfully manipulates perceptions through tailored messaging and carefully selected communication channels, achieving media and political impact pushed to its extreme.

Since not all proponents of the technoscientific ideology hold power or fully embrace the presidential rhetoric, tensions frequently arise between some of them and the executive branch. This was illustrated by the public feud between Trump and Apple CEO Tim Cook, regarding the president's demand for massive reshoring of the company's operations at the beginning of his second term. Notably, Trump-Cook relations were already contentious during the Trump I administration due to the same issue, with the president previously criticizing Apple's extensive offshoring of production to China.

Thus, reversing deindustrialization has become this administration's economic priority, focusing on bringing industrial jobs back to American soil and reducing dependence on China in sectors once dominated by the U.S. This fundamentally geoeconomic issue also reflects the power struggle between the administration and digital oligarchs, an internal conflict transforming America into an arena of strategic maneuvering around the crucial stake of controlling postindustrial technological rents. These interactions also reveal the precarious balance between the administration's neoconservative wing and the digital oligarchs prominently represented within DOGE. While DOGE's official mission is to reduce the size of the federal government, this could be interpreted as a power grab strategy. Musk, appointed to lead this department ostensibly to make government operations "more democratic", has already clashed directly with Marco Rubio over what the tech advisor called "insufficient efforts" to streamline the State Department's functioning[77].

The internal divisions stemming from these figures differing backgrounds are far from trivial. But other risks loom for this administration, particularly the potential concentration of power between messianic/neoconservative politicians and Silicon Valley leaders who embody the dazzling rise of a technologically-driven oligarchy with its own ideological agenda. Here, the risk of conflict of interest is evident, as the financial interests of this tech oligarchy may ultimately conflict with those of the federal government[78], which remains committed to proactive reindustrialization and reshoring policies without compromise.

Conclusion

In summary, analyzing the reindustrialization dynamics in the United States reveals a tripartite power structure within the American executive branch, with each faction representing distinct constituencies, values, and potentially divergent interests, a configuration inherently prone to tensions and mutual distrust. Yet it is the MAGA movement, despite its alleged populism, anti-elitism and anti-establishment character, that appears to be consolidating central authority between the other two ostensibly opposing poles. This is evidenced by growing tensions between neoconservative and technoscientific elites over several key issues: the contested relevance of DOGE's role (reflecting Elon Musk's managerial approach) and the urgent imperative for domestic reshoring of industries, particularly in sensitive sectors, as demanded by the administration's other power centers. To align with the presidential agenda and gain credibility, the technoscientific elite is expected to accelerate reindustrialization efforts, especially in sectors most impacted by offshoring. Notably, high-tech firms were the primary beneficiaries of globalization's offshoring experiment.

A realistic assessment of the current administration's strengths and paradoxes suggests potential for American economic resurgence. With a historical track record of remarkable resilience, the U.S. now holds a unique opportunity to rebalance its economic relations with global partners. This analysis also implies the Democratic Party era may be ending, outmaneuvered by Republican and MAGA vitality, Democrats have demonstrated limitations

in both mobilization capacity and overcoming internal contradictions (wokeism, elitism, electoralism & militarism).

Ultimately, this administration will be judged by the success (or failure) of its reindustrialization policy, not by any messianic, or self-fulfilling prophecies, in an era where national power is measured by trade balances, patents, and industrial productivity. The primary levers of action remain in the hands of digital oligarchs who benefited from the favorable economic climate of the 1990s-2000s, and now operate with a distinctly techno-nationalist logic (for most of them). While they possess the necessary financial resources for this undertaking, as Marx reminds us, "capital remains cowardly"... foreshadowing a future potentially marked by instability or, in worst-case scenarios, deindustrialization and discord. Conversely, should effective national synergy emerge with tangible results, it could give birth to a new political force in the United States, a techno-nationalist movement capable of reshaping domestic politics, while enhancing America's soft power appeal abroad.

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