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Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

 **Rachid Hidougui***

University 20 august 1955 Skikda (Algeria)
hidouguirachid2002@hotmail.fr

 **Ahmed Messaoud Sid Ali**

University Mohamed Boudiaf M'Sila (Algeria)
sidali_280@yahoo.fr

Abstract:

This article reviews Algeria's geostrategic position and its political dimensions during World War II and the Allies' vision of it through the great landing of the Americans and the British on November 8, 1942 in North Africa (Morocco and Algeria), known under the famous code given by F.D.Roosevelt: "Operation Torch». Thus, this landing was the beginning of a major setback for the German power, the operation which was carried out in Casablanca (Morocco), in Oran and west of Algiers, was qualified as "bisector of the war". Indeed, the Allies were able to open another field of war in the south of the Western Front at a time when all of Europe (except Britain) was in Hitler's hands. From this landing, the Allies were able to besiege Rommel's forces and liberate Tunisia, which allowed them to open the way to Sicily, southern Italy and western France .

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***Corresponding author**

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Introduction

The Second World War, in that it was a major and complex event has been worthy of scientific and methodological study across many different disciplines. Various scholars have studied this event from an economic and historical point of view. There are those who engaged in it from a geopolitics point of view, and there are those who studied it in its tragic aspects, etc. As for researchers in history, they worked to present the series of events in a systematic chronological way, emphasizing with methods of description and argument, subjecting all the accessible knowledge to analysis and criticism. By and large, the standard for this analysis and criticism is to maintain objectivity, emotional restraint and lack of bias of various kinds. The essential importance of studying the Second World War is that it took the world to the largest extent of murder, extermination, displacement, internment, deportation, torture, starvation and humiliation of human beings in large parts of the world. It manifested the terrible destruction of the cultural, social and scientific gains achieved by humanity, and of infrastructure, particularly in Europe, North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific. This article addresses the following Research Questions:

- Was Algeria, as geographic region, and as a French colony, a significant conflict region influencing the course of the Second World War?
- Is there any credible evidence that focused of enduring conflict between Charles De Gaulle's governments and United States administration president Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
- Did the problems which arose due to the differences between Dr Gaulle and Roosevelt lead to conflict between them, and did this have an impact on the progress of the war?

The situation of the conflict between the United States of America, under Roosevelt and the "Free Government of France", under Charles De Gaulle did not seem to be publicly well known at the time, but it did exist. Documents from sources and references, especially the written archive, speeches and recorded meetings demonstrated and confirmed this clearly.

This conflict became more apparent around the French colonial region of North Africa, particularly Algeria. Algeria was regarded by France, Marshal Philippe Petain, and General De Gaulle as its most important colony of the era. This importance derived from the different contribution and significance of this colony, especially its geo-strategic site in the world map, to French national security, its economic and natural goods. The collapse of the French state since the beginning of the war resulted in uncontrolled greed by new international forces in the Africa Region. The United States of America considered its final position on the war in Europe to be a matter of time. Furthermore; the United States' delay in joining Europe and on the side of Britain is a matter of giving of excuses, no more. In this article, we will try to identify the aspects and manifestations of differences and misunderstandings that have characterized the United State are vice versa Gaullist relations with a focus on the situation and the causes.

This matter was of great importance as Algeria's colonies importance that led to Anglo-American landing took place in Algeria and the preparations that preceded it. Those preparations were careful that made at the highest levels in the American and British countries. All of these events happened in De Gaulle's absence, even though this huge military event took place on Algerian soil, which the French considered as French territory since 1833. In fact, the preparations and the details of the landing in Algeria were in the presence of French, but excluding De Gaulle, where President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to rely on those French, under the government of Marshal Petain, especially military ones. Those officers and high-level officials in the fascist administration included General Henri Giraud, Admiral François Darlan, Maxime Weygand, and many others. This led to a great resentment by Charles De Gaulle towards

Washington because he considers himself, his followers, and his organization to be the first to declare a refusal to comply with Hitler's demands which the United States did not acknowledge respectfully. Furthermore, he was the first to declare resistance against occupation and against surrendering to the German will. All of this was during De Gaulle's exile in London, the capital of Britain, which was considered by all as the largest, permanent ally, the country that was historically, culturally, and politically closest to the United States of America. However; in the end, Charles De Gaulle managed to turn all political tracks in his favor, forced the Americans to recognize his leadership of free France, the majority's resistance of the French people, with him as President of the French state after the end of the Second World War. Using his political wisdom and stability, he managed to displace and overcome all those who competed with him, particularly those who were supported by Americans such as General Henri Giraud. According to references that are available to us, it is very apparent on that conflict but was a part of the history of the people of North Africa, and events in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya during this war were linked to each other. We believe this article chronicles the major events and tremors that affected on people of North Africa's region from 1939 to the end of the war.

1. The United States of America and French North Africa during the Second World War

The United State attention to the North African region after the outbreak of the Second World War remained locked into the economic policies followed by the United States during the First World War and beyond. Its war industry had sophisticated means of production, and made huge profits, which resulted from financing of the battle fronts in Europe and in the European overseas colonies. This may explain why it had maintained diplomatic relations with the "Nazi National Socialist Party" NAZI , since it came to power in 1933, until the date of Germany's declaration of war on the United States of America, as a consequence of Germany being within the axis alliance when Japan attacked the United States in the Pearl Harbor incident in December 1941. Therefore, the French fall in June 1940 to Germany did not constitute a major event for the United States, which continued to officially establish relations with the Vichy pro-Hitler government in France, and through it with its colonies. However; the Soviet Red Army's advance after the Battle of Stalingrad was a threat to American strategic interests not only in Europe, but also in Africa, particularly in the north of the continent. That's why Washington administration was quick to start weaving and establishing contacts, and then allied itself with the French colonies from 1940. It sent its Consul Robert Murphy, who had made contacts with several important Algerian political figures. These figures included those supporting for French official authority in Paris, opposition to it from supporters of Free France government in London, and even some Algerian militants in the most important currents and parties of the national movement.

These activities took place in full view of the leader of the free Government of France, under General Charles De Gaulle of whom the Official Authority of the United State had reservations. The Official Authority of the United States was seen De Gaulle as a quasi-obstacle to the containment policy that the United States was preparing him to inherit the throne of the "classic" colonial empires.

2. Algeria as a rear base for the Free France government

Charles De Gaulle's supporters believed that Algeria was not a concern of French resistance leaders until two years after that humiliating surrender and fall of Paris. According to this belief, it made not Algeria within its interests by making it a background base for the resistance. But the general context of this following the occupation of Paris was indicated of something else. This formed a nucleus for supporters of the Free France government before its President, De Gaulle, came from his London headquarters to Algeria, because Charles De Gaulle was undisputedly the first to reject the accomplished fact and the first advocate of resistance and alliance alongside

Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

Britain to defeat the unjust German force. He was indeed the main contributor and the first supervisor of the resistance from London, and later from Algeria. However; Algeria, led by the supporters under De Gaulle, had embraced the resistance movement since the fall of Paris, but their activities had been modest, and was unable to stabilize its feet definitely until the spring of 1941 ¹Moreover, a resistance movement under De Gaulle was existence based on propaganda, and media ².

It seemed that Algeria, as a French colony at that time, could no longer be the capital of the French resistance, particularly after the matter was settled in favor of the authority of Marshal Philippe Petain. De Gaulle set for himself a main and primary goal starting from his headquarters, namely, to organize resistance from London and deploy it throughout the entire French colonies, including Algeria. Moreover, this was focused on diplomatic aspect, propaganda, secret work, and less so on the direct military aspect. Moreover, this prompted Charles De Gaulle to express anger and condemnation of the British air force's bombing of the port of Grand Marina in Oran ³, destroying a part of the French navy, and the killing of many of French people there on July 03, 1940 ⁴.

De Gaulle considered that this was harmful to the nascent resistance movement against the occupation and its allies from France. The birth of the supporters of a free France was appeared to be controversial and was disputed among French historians. According to Andre Nouschi, there was existed of right-wing, left-wing, centrists, and communist supporters of the resistance which constituted a secret organization of resistance to surrender and occupation on November 1940 ⁵.According to the Overseas Archive and what the French security services have offered. It was clear that the history given by Nouschi about the beginning of the activity of Free France supporters on November 1940 is inaccurate. The Archive dates back to the month of July of the same year, where French security services monitored leaflets distributed by supporters of De Gaulle in Algeria. Later that day, leaflets praised Gaulle's nationalism, calling on all French Algeria affiliations to resist surrendering and to form alliances with the British state. On the other hand, the Secretary of State for War in Marshal Philippe Petain's government had been confirmed, in his correspondences that were addressed to General Beynat ⁶.

The commander of the nineteenth district in Algeria had been informed about exist British propaganda for De Gaulle on September 02, 1940. Marshal Philippe Petain also recommended taking the necessary measures to contain the influences of this propaganda, which would double the number of those fleeing the French army in Algeria and join the British interests. General Beynat, explained this matter by sending his instructions on September 05, 1940 to various military aspects. Beynat called for taking all precautions to prevent attempts infiltrate and escape process, whether for soldiers or officers. These concerns explain the nature of the document issued by the Government of Marshal Petain on October 08, 1940, and these concerns had confirmed on the existence of activities of sympathizers of De Gaulle in the Oran region after it confirmed the existence of propaganda against Vichy Petain government which was led by the Jewish ⁷.

By November 1940, the frequency of exchange of reports between the central authority in Paris and French Colonial Administrator to Algeria and its three provinces were increasing. In its entirety, political correspondences indicated that there were activities of supporters of a free Government of France in many provinces of the country. This was confirmed by the correspondence sent by Paris government on October 24, 1940, considering what had been previously reported. The propaganda activity was formed by the supporters of free France, under De Gaulle that called for taking all the necessary measures to face the propaganda activities. IN

this case, the activities of supporters of free France existed in Algeria immediately after De Gaulle's speech from London on 18 June 1940.

Although the supporters of this new government were not well structured and were disorganized at that time, their association with the Communist movement remained in our concept late until the end of 1940 for the following reasons:

- The French resistance was initially formed by a group of European who were victims of the Government of Marshal Petain such as Jews, Freemasons, Liberal Democrats, with no mention of the Communists at all ⁸.

- The correspondence sent by the French security services to French Colonial Administrator to governorate of Oran Governor on December 29, 1940, denied any move by the Communists against the authority of the Paris government in Algeria until the end of December 1940 ⁹.

3. Algeria as the first nucleus for the formation of the Free France government

Algeria, in its three provinces, was the location of the activities of the supporters of free France, from the end of 1940, as we have already seen before. Activities embraced propaganda work based on fundraising ¹⁰.and then armed resistance ¹¹. Although the supporters of this front were a minority, they soon became an effective and dynamic minority. The supporters opened up to Charles De Gaulle's governmental fertile and promising prospect for resistance and liberation. The figures that formed the first nucleus of the resistance were in force and working with the Vichy government. For this reason, it took advantage of its influence in the crucible of the resistance by penetrating the various French agencies, including the security and military ones in particular. The most prominent of these figures are Colonel Charles Louise ¹². Colonel Jousse, Major Beaufre ¹³, and they all have been practicing their official duties normally.

They were discovered only in a few cases by Germans, such as with Colonel Jousse and Major Beaufre, who were discovered and arrested at the end of 1941 ¹⁴.Although, Governor André Achiari was in a position as a security official in Algiers, this did not prevent him from trying to contact to De Gaulle's supporters and build a strong nucleus from the end of June 1940 ¹⁵. Despite Achiara's first failed attempt to link contacts with Free France-De Gaulle supporters, he became one of the prominent leaders during the secret stage activity. This was after he was assigned to protect the resistance groups in the cities of Algeria and Oran from security surveillance and security pursuit's ¹⁶.The government of free France in Algeria, in addition to the security leaders included different categories of social, cultural and even religious classes during this period. The categories were in the cities of Algiers and Oran particularly. Furthermore, all of those categories are from French, European settlers, and even Jews ¹⁷.

3.1. Algeria is in the American circle of attention

After First World War (1914/18), the United States of America wanted to strengthen its position after it came out of isolation by joining that war. The United States of America was the strongest reason for the Allies' victory. Since the end of that war, the United States found itself as an aspiring force in compensating the traditional powers represented in France, Britain, and influencing the issues of the contemporary world. Although the United State returned to isolation one further time from the beginning of the twenties until 1941, the United State during the beginning of the Second World War 1939/1945 took the same basic approach as it did at the beginning of the first war. It delayed its involvement in the war until after the Japanese Air Force bombed its base in Pearl Harbor (Hawaii State) on December 1941.This involvement reinforced its presence not only in Europe, the theater of major warfare operations, but also outside the European continent including in European colonies ¹⁸. Furthermore, Algeria was one of the most important colonies for France where it was the most important colonial state. The Washington Administration had chosen the city of Algiers as the headquarters of the United State Consular

Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

mission headed by Robert P. Murphy to the Government of Marshal Philippe Petain. This event was achieved a relationship renewal between the two States during autumn of 1940, which was actually completed in early 1941 ¹⁹.

Robert Murphy settled in Algeria and became the most informed American insider on its affairs. He was the supervisor of the Anglo-American landing operation from the beginning of its preparations until its successful implementation on the night on November 08, 1942. After the successful landing operations, he represented of President Franklin Roosevelt ²⁰. Indeed, Robert Murphy's stability in Algeria enabled him to strengthen his relations with French political and military figures, where he took advantage of the conditions of war, want, poverty, and famines that the colonial people lived in, particularly Algeria. Robert Murphy was ready to respond to requests of General Maxim Weygand who was the French Colonial Administrator to Algeria. General Maxim Weygand's headquarter was in Algiers. Weygand requested economic help from the United States of America for North Africa ²¹, which was provided and embodied in the signing of an economic agreement between Robert Murphy and Weygand on February 26, 1941. Accordingly; the United State funded the colony of Algeria with energy and food stuff.

This activity was characterized the movement of R. Murphy to represent of United State President F. Roosevelt at the Vichy administration, whose residence in Algeria was chosen. These activities opened the way for the American administration in North Africa and highlighted the strategic role that Algeria might play as a colony or as a United State base with strategic geopolitical importance from which Europe would be liberated. For these reasons, the American interest focused on finding representatives in Algeria from the French side who would support American policies after the end of the war. We mentioned the relationship and advantages earlier that was based mainly on diplomatic ties and close economic subsidies. The relationship between the two administrations enabled Consul R. Murphy and his deputy in charge of intelligence to enjoy exceptional freedom in Algeria and for the American mission to be active and absolute throughout Algeria. This strategy strongly manifested after the United State entered the war with the Allies on December, 1941. After the success of the massive Anglo-American military landing in Algeria on the night on August 8, 1942, Algeria effectively became the starting point for the liberation of Europe. This landing justified successive landings in Europe such as the landing of Sicily, and the landing of Normandy. It was the concluding phase of the Second World War ²².

Consequently, we believe that the military's efforts defeat the Axis armies and their pursuit, forcing them to retreat, surrender in Tunisia, southern, and Western Europe started primarily from Algeria. This is from the testimony of the military and political leaders of the allies, particularly British and Americans such as Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, and General Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Allied forces in North Africa. Rather, German military leaders such as General Alfred Jodl, all agreed on Algeria's strategic importance and that the victory of allied armies began with the success of Operation Torch (Landing) on the night on November 08, 1942. The defeat of the Axis armies began with the success of that landing on that date ²³

. In addition, the White House administration also realized the special importance of Algeria in terms of the functional aspect of military action, thus making it a central focus of that process of landing. Also, it is clear that through the control in Algeria, it would be able control France, and moreover, the west of the European continent in general ²⁴. Consequently, President F. Roosevelt hoped that, in the meantime, the territory of Algeria, particularly, and North Africa in general, it would be a base of American operations during the war, and the United States post-war Influence zone ²⁵.

4. Discussion

4.1. Free Government of France and the United States of America

Immediately, after its emergence the free Government of France had been able to reconnect and re-establish relations with many countries. These countries included the United States of America²⁶. As it was the main supplier and funder of the war before it entered the war, particularly for France and Britain. Thus, ties with United States of America were necessary as well as the United Kingdom. However, it was also based on respect for the rights of the free French government led by De Gaulle, and respect for their share as an ally state with its share of the gains of victory after the war²⁷. Therefore, we can observe two distinct positions (the phase of ambiguity in the situation; and, the phase of turning a blind eye to the activities of the Gaullist) for the United State and French relations during the military landings in Algeria and the Far Maghreb.

4.2. The phase of ambiguity in the situation

The United States of America's foreign policy during the Second World War towards France was considered unbalanced in the eyes of supporters of the Free France government. Before the United States joined the Allies in the War, they recognized Marshal Petain's authority and established diplomatic relations with his surrendering government and pro-Hitler stance. This was because, at the time, their interests and policies were more aligned. Initially, the foreign policy of the United States refused to support France's free government, and it denied attempt to control Senegal after the battle of Dakar²⁸ on September, 1940. In spite of those relations, the United State decided to control Algeria on November 1942 which is subject to Philippe Petain²⁹.

On the other hand, there was no relationship between the United State, and the Free France government at the beginning of the war because the American public opinion at the time was not interested in what happened to France. Indeed, the United State government was establishing relations with the Vichy government as previously mentioned³⁰. However, this did not prevent Charles De Gaulle on spring of 1941 from tied his relationship with the Washington administration³¹. Moreover; De Gaulle sent Rene Pleven, as special Commissioner in his name to activate those relationships as well as signing of several commercial deals to supply weapons to the French resistance and various war supplies. In addition Pleven formed pro-free France committees within the United State of American, and the organization of economic and financial reports that sent between the French colonies of Free France on the one hand, and the United State of American on the other³². From a political point of view, the meeting that brought together the representative of General De Gaulle, Pleven and representatives of the United States Department on October 1941 was the first official meeting³³. This meeting gathered the parties who wanted to feel each other's pulse³⁴. Gaullists have considered that this meeting was a miserable meeting, and they considered that the United State imposed conditions on them and France³⁵.

De Gaulle did not accept these conditions after he was informed that there had been parallel contacts with French Colonial Administrator of the Vichy government to Algeria, General Maxime Weygand. Moreover, the United State requested General Maxime Weygand to tell Marshal's authority of the United States' vision that Washington had not yet decided which French's parties will be biased it³⁶. Accordingly, American-French relations had reached a degree of volatility at the time. The Americans made Britain a media to resupply for the free government of France on November, 1941³⁷. De Gaulle set up regular relations between his government and the ambassador of the United States in London³⁸. These relations did not end De Gaulle's apprehensions toward President Franklin Roosevelt, who used to see at De Gaulle as of

Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

an undisciplined political type. The aspirations of the Americans in the French colonies, particularly those in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans were vital. Accordingly, on September 1941, De Gaulle sent his forces to the Islands of Pierre and Miquelon in the North Atlantic (off Canada) in order to control those islands. This military operation, which is close to the territory of the United State, exacerbated the Washington administration's distance from De Gaulle ³⁹. Although the United State followed a rapprochement policy with the leaders of free France before the North African landing process ⁴⁰ the United State kept the leaders of free France away from preparations for the landing. De Gaulle and his supporters were excluded from the process of preparing for landing in Algeria, as well as in Morocco. This led his supporters to consider that preparation of the landing, which Robert Murphy had planned in complete secrecy and away from the free French, was an act against the free government of France ⁴¹. Additionally, his supporters accused President F. Roosevelt of being behind the recommendation which Roosevelt sent to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to ban Charles De Gaulle from being in North Africa ⁴².

So, the United State arranged and discussed the landing process with supporters of the Vichy government administration instead of De Gaulle. Specifically, the United State was urged to contact Admiral François Darlan ⁴³.

the former French prime minister, which they presented the idea to him on September 1942 ⁴⁴. Because the Americans did not trust De Gaulle politically in their future European policy particularly, post-war in view of De Gaulle's positions announced from Radio Brazzaville. Furthermore, De Gaulle refused to cooperate with the Washington administration on the issue of New Caledonia being put it under the control of the United States Navy and being used to strike Japan ⁴⁵. That's why they bet on other French figures.

4.3. The phase of turning a blind eye to the activities of the Gaullist

We mean that, in which White House turned a blind eye to the relations that supporters of the Free French government established with a large part of the public opinion components inside the United State. These relationships were through diplomatic missions that were opened there. Despite the tension that characterized the official relationship between De Gaulle and the United State, the United State allowed the sympathizers of De Gaulle and the French resistance to form associations and cells affiliated with De Gaulle since the end of June 1940.

The first of these organizations appeared in New York City ⁴⁶. Additionally, many in the United States witnessed French fleeing from the Vichy regime. In addition, many clubs and associations were formed to support the free Government of France. These organizations influenced on several influential Americans who in turn supported the French resistance movement represented by the followers of De Gaulle ⁴⁷.

. Consequently, De Gaulle deemed it a widespread victory for his ideas.

Accordingly, there were in the depths of American public opinion, enthusiastic reactions to the issue of the Free France government which carried the banner of resistance and national liberation ⁴⁸. De Gaulle's supporters were managed to open many their representatives in the United States of America ⁴⁹ including extended ties of vassalage to various sectors of the American society starting on December 1941. However, the United State did return an attack on De Gaulle and his movement, after its forces occupied the islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, as we indicated earlier ⁵⁰. Over time, De Gaulle's supporters managed to impose themselves on the United States of America. Particularly, after Gaston Palewski took charge in the Gaullist movement of the relations between free France and the American administration. Palewski built effective bridges with Americans. Palewski used his experience in propagandist and media to this end. Consequently, he managed to link relations with American newspapers and to persuade

many American journalists of the fairness of the issue defended by Charles De Gaulle. He shed light on prejudice and injustice he faced from American politicians ⁵¹, particularly from the Roosevelt administration.

4.4. Backgrounds of the American-Gaullist conflict

We had previously said that at the beginning of the Second World War, the United States - French relationship was linked to the association of the United States Administration with the Vichy government, because the United States needs to preserve commercial and strategic interests. However; the United States began to look for an alternative to the Vichy government, but not someone like De Gaulle who was not hiding his concern about an American presence in French North Africa. We will know some of the background of the two positions in the following aspects:

4.5. Background of the supporters of the Free France Government (Gaullist)

- The United States wanted to extend its influence over the remaining colonies of the French Empire after the murderous defeat of the prestige of the great French state by the Germans, resulting in a decline in the importance of France in its overseas colonies ⁵²

- The United States recognized Vichy's authority of government over the territory of the French Empire, linked diplomatic, and economic relations with it, and all of which came to be detrimental to the French government of De Gaulle ⁵³.

- The United States administration's had a negative attitude on arbitrary detentions, follow-up and legal measures that befell General De Gaulle's supporters by Marshal Philippe Pétain's government ⁵⁴. Particularly, Jewish citizens and these were done at direction of the Berlin administration.

- The United States administration relentlessly pursued a policy to marginalize the supporters of the free French government on both French and international arenas. This started from its exclusion from participation in the private discussions of the United Nations Charter in December 1941, ending in not being involved from near or far in the process of preparing for the landing of allies in Algeria and the far Morocco ⁵⁵.

- The Free France supporters accused the United States of trying to split their ranks and working to encourage all voices opposed to the Free French government and De Gaulle in particular. Moreover, these actions were at the instigation of the American White House ⁵⁶.

- The United States of America's desire to neutralize De Gaulle and look for a strong military commander since the beginning of 1942 who could substitute for De Gaulle with whom they could deal and cooperate with politically and militarily ⁵⁷.

5. Backgrounds of the United States administration's position

The Americans considered that Charles De Gaulle was an uncomfortable figure for their policy as we mentioned, and difficult to count on, particularly in the post-war phase ⁵⁸. Therefore, they deemed his policies would probably lead the region with French influence to slide into the communist circuit ⁵⁹. Particularly, the majority of the populations of North Africa were against the supporters of the De Gaulle, and his government - Free France. Hence, the administration of President Roosevelt had reserved to deal with him in light of the existing international situation at the time, and this situation would set up international relations into the future ⁶⁰. Actually, that is what happened, so that the French state under President De Gaulle withdrew from the "Treaty of NATO" in 1964, France was one of the largest countries that was a founder of this great strategic military alliance. It was the only country in the west of the continent that has taken this action, which greatly harmed the United States strategy during the period of preparation for confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

The reason for the resentment of the United States of America for Charles De Gaulle came after his refusal to recognize the authority of the United States of America on the Terre-Neuve⁶¹, archipelago in north-eastern Canada - De Gaulle considered it a land under French sovereignty. American politicians considered De Gaulle's failure to occupy Dakar with the British on September 1940 led to ignored him through the United State⁶².

6. Mercian support for Henri Giraud and the consequences of the American Gaullist conflict Henri Giraud's supporting as an alternative to De Gaulle

On April 1942, General Henri Giraud escaped from captivity of German forces, and returned to Paris where he was able to link his contacts with the American military command. Whereas American military was preparing to enter the war and arrange landing in French North Africa, he suggested that the French-American operation should be joint under his own leadership. Hence, the Allies agreed to his plan to be implemented on November 1942⁶³. On board a British submarine, he left France for Gibraltar to meet General Eisenhower at his headquarters on 07 November, 1942. However, Eisenhower refused to assign the command of Operation Torch to Giraud, and Eisenhower indicated to Giraud should immediately join Algeria because the landing will take place on the night of November 08, 1942. Giraud was named as general commander of the French forces in North Africa. However, after Admiral Darlan was assassinated on 25 December, 1942, Giraud was appointed as general civilian and military commander for French Africa. Furthermore, Giraud had been called to represent France at the Anfa Conference in Casablanca, Kingdom of Morocco on 17 December, 1943 in Casablanca, attended by the three senior officials, US President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and a representative of the Free France Government, as well as Giraud himself. The conference had urged the necessity of reconciliation between the Giraud and De Gaulle. Therefore, Roosevelt tried to keep the French-French conflict in favor of Giraud, so the United State administration was more inclined to support Giraud. In addition Giraud had been supported by a group of people who were loyal to the Republican regime of Roosevelt, including, in particular, Maurice Couve, Andre Labarthe, and Rene Meyer⁶⁴. However, this did not lead General Giraud to surpass De Gaulle. In addition, most of the correspondences indicated that Giraud had always had less political wisdom and intelligence than De Gaulle, who was able to surpass Giraud a year after Anfa Conference and managed to control everything⁶⁵. As Giraud had failed to displace De Gaulle from leadership of the French Resistance Committee, the Allies, particularly President F. Roosevelt, Giraud failed to surpass De Gaulle in the French affairs.

Therefore, Roosevelt required Political elites to recognize De Gaulle as the highest official in the French state, the French people, and the French colonies⁶⁶. The first thing De Gaulle did after feeling that the Americans and the English wanted to dispense with him, commencing from September 01, 1942, and after he was informed that they have arranging landings in French North Africa, was to contact the Soviet Ambassador in London. De Gaulle offered to the Soviet Ambassador to transfer De Gaulle's headquarters and the headquarters of his forces to Soviet lands⁶⁷, which is a daring action and idea by De Gaulle to create a new reality. Accordingly, President F. Roosevelt needed to absorb De Gaulle rather than leave the opportunity for Joseph Stalin to find a paved road to the West of the European continent and North Africa.

Roosevelt's new policy shift began in dealing with the Gaullist and its supporters in the free French government, which De Gaulle had founded in 1940 as a means of refusing to surrender, as a means for resistance and victory, even with an unequal and heterogeneous alliance with the British and the Americans. Moreover, De Gaulle mobilized his organization, "France Fighting", on August, 1942, when he visited his supporters and forces in North Africa, and the

East. In the process he made a show of strength, and put the allies before the accomplished fact. Americans did not accept ⁶⁸.

that he made Algeria his headquarters on May 30, but gave him more and more control of the situation. Consequently, the allies became faced with a new accomplished fact that was difficult for them to surpass. Therefore, De Gaulle asked his supporters to reinforce the resistance inside France to impose an accomplished fact policy, and forced the Allies in particular Roosevelt, commencing on March 1942 ⁶⁹. One of the results of the Soviet rapprochement with De Gaulle was the positive rapprochement between the Soviet Communist Party and the French Communist Party ⁷⁰. Furthermore, the Soviet Union condemned the American-British policy against De Gaulle and his organization. Indeed, this rapprochement urged the safety of French lands, and even issuing a statement on September 28, 1942 submitting that De Gaulle is the only legitimate representative for France Fighting ⁷¹.

Realistically speaking, the economical, militarily, and the financial circumstances faced by the Soviet Union during Second World War especially in 1941 up to 1943 made it unable to face the Gaullist question and the French resistance. If this statement had any importance, it is only of media importance, not more, because President Joseph Stalin's attention focused on how to eliminate the invading German armies, which entered the Soviet Union, chasing them and liberating all of Eastern Europe from the German occupation. This required opening of a long and wide war-front spanning from Kursk Belarus in the north to the Caucasus in the south, and from Stalingrad in the east to Berlin, the capital of the third Reich in the heart of Europe in the west.

As for political considerations, it seems that the Soviet Union always needed strong communist activity in the capitalist countries. Particularly, the western European countries, the Soviet Union had to coordinate with them in some way. We believe that it is very unlikely that Charles De Gaulle would be subjected to Soviet domination in exchange for the Soviets extending their hand to his figure or organization. He is known for independence and rejection of any foreign domination of France, his state, which he still considered a major state. As for talking about a Gaullist-American conflict; we believe that it was limited to frames of difference and a state of misunderstanding between the two parties. We believe that General Charles De Gaulle was able, with his audacity, courage, temper, and ability to confront and managed to impose himself on the Americans and President F. Roosevelt in particular. This was by linking his close relations with the British, particularly, the Prime Minister, Churchill in the first place, and some Algerian officers who trust the American President such as General Eisenhower later.

7. The Supreme Command of the allies in Algeria and its place on the demands of the Algerians

In this section, we recognize, but we don't want to talk much about Algeria as a colony whose people lived in tragedies of all kinds, in all its dimensions, and for a period of more than a hundred and ten years. However, it is important to state briefly, by focusing on the demands of the national movement and the response of the American leadership represented by General Eisenhower to those demands made on him. The Atlantic meeting on 14 August, 1941, brought together the American President and the British prime minister and included the question of the hopes and aspirations of people to decide own self-determination. These two countries did not wish regional changes inconsistent with the free desires of the people concerned. Accordingly, the two countries officially respected the right of all people to choose to form governments in where live. They have wanted to see the rights of sovereignty, self-government, and to restore to those people what had been stripped of them by force ⁷².

One of these general principles emerged in the Charter of the United Nations after the meetings of the ministers of the United State, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Ambassador of

Algeria and its Geo-Political Dimension in American Maneuvers during the Second World War (1940-1942)

China (The Four Nations). After discussions which continued until 1945, the Charter and its draft ratification at the San Francisco Conference, was adopted as a key reference in the organization of international relations at the end of the Second World War to the present day. The Algerian political elite, represented by national parties and figures absorbed what was stated in the Atlantic Charter. Moreover, they had a political position on the strategic events imposed by the major powers in Algeria. The full level an achievement by the Algerian National Movement was to agree on a unified statement for the national movement. On February 10, 1942 this statement was signed by more than thirty national figures representing all political parties in Algeria. This included demands that did not depart from the framework of the aforementioned International Charter. It focused on determining the fate of the Algerian people, language, public freedoms, releasing detainees, and eliminates laws that discriminated between Europeans and Algerians in Algeria in rights and duties ⁷³.

Copies of this statement were delivered to the representatives of the North African Allied Command and Eisenhower general headquarters in Algeria. Moreover, the French Colonial Administrators to Algeria, Marcel Peyrouton and Georges Catroux, who represents Charles De Gaulle, received a copy of the statement. Farahat Abbas played the primary public role in this unique movement, and he had another look at the situation that the world was going through at the time, which we can see through such a statement. So, Farahat Abbas said that "I will suspend all political activity and devote myself entirely to saving the French nation, to which our future is linked, because if France were to lose its status as a major power, our ideal of freedom would be buried forever ⁷⁴.

The position of De Gaulle's administration was only to express confirmation of the well-known colonial policy. He justified that the war conditions did not allow wading into such those issues. The position of the Americans and the British was not distinguished from the French position as they all considered that the issue is French first and foremost. They had harmony with what was announced before the landing process ⁷⁵.

President Eisenhower stated this through leaflets dropped from planes in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (French North Africa) regarding the issue. These leaflets stated, "We will leave your country when the German and Italian danger goes away of us, and French sovereignty over the regions will remain unchanged. «Indeed, on September 30, 1943, Eisenhower met with De Gaulle, and the two did not address the Algerian national issue and concluded the meeting, emphasizing the necessity of continuing the effort to end the war in favor of the allies, including France under De Gaulle. After that, De Gaulle controlled all situations in France, and he managed to surpass his rivals and opponents, especially Henri Giraud ⁷⁶.

Conclusion

We conclude and summarize with the following:

- The importance of Algeria's geostrategic position during World War II, recognized as such by the allies, which enabled them to defeat Hitler. This strategic position continues to attract the interest of the great powers until today. The landing that was made on the Algerian coast is as important as that of Normandy; it behooves us as historians to value its historical facts and to show the importance of Algeria for ourselves and the others.
- Britain remained as the first and strongest guarantor of the survival of Charles De Gaulle while the White House had a desire to exclude him from the leadership of the French resistance against German occupation.
- De Gaulle created an accomplished fact that made it difficult for his opponents to surpass him.
- De Gaulle's was through his wisdom, his priority in declaring his refusal to surrender, his perseverance, the strength of his political rhetoric, and his association with London, in

particular, Winston Churchill. All of these aspects enabled him overcome all the difficulties that stood in his way from the beginning to the end, particularly between 1940 and 1944.

- The conflict between De Gaulle and Roosevelt, regardless of their severity, did not result in any positive repercussions that would benefit the peoples of the French colonies. This conflict or dispute did not bring any direct harm to any party. Because the tragic situations that existed in the colonies and in Algeria remained, and the demands of the national movement did not help in obtaining any gains in favor of the national issue, even if at the minimum.
- The occupation continued, and even increased its ferocity with denials of Algerians' great contribution to the war to Allies' favor. The end of the Second World War and the victory of the Allies marked the beginning of the mass killing of more than 45 thousand people by the French military machine, which commence don May 8, 1945. Mass killings were permitted through officially closing the eyes of the Allies' government, especially the Americans and the British. Thus, the principle of self-determination of people, which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, was not it of no concern to France, Britain and America to the colonies' people in any way. Rather, the principle of self-determination was exercised to set up governments in defeated countries, particularly the major ones Germany, Italy and Japan whose policies are in line with the Allied policy to protect the Security Peace Worlds in the future according to their vision geo-strategic exclusively.

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